Religion, Violence, and the State in 21st Century Europe

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At the close of the twentieth century, historian René Rémond observed that “in the west of Europe the old lands of Christendom are engaged in the last phase of secularization” (Rémond 1999: 209). Such a statement reflects the notion—first announced by Enlightenment thinkers and firmly entrenched by post-war modernization theorists—that religion is of declining importance in the developed world. Recently, however, a wave of scholars has challenged the secularization thesis by highlighting the continued salience of religion in Western Europe. Research has focused on the “deprivatization” of religion (Casanova 1994), the persistence of religious belief and the rise in Europeans’ spirituality (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Halman and Draulans 2004), the role of the church as a political interest group (Warner 2000), and the impact of confessional heritages and levels of religiosity on policy outcomes (Minkenberg 2002). If there has been one particularly charged topic elevating the profile of religious issues, however, it has been relations between European states and their Muslim minorities. As Rémond himself admits, notwithstanding overarching trends toward secularization, “there are quite unprecedented problems resulting from the presence in Europe of several million Muslims…who wish to enjoy all the rights conferred upon them by belonging to a European nation but also to preserve their habits and customs” (Rémond 1999: 213).

Global fears of a clash of civilizations and pointed local conflicts have called into question the ability of Europe’s Muslims and non-Muslims to thrive side-by-side. Researchers have responded to such concerns with a proliferation of studies over the past twenty years describing the situation of Muslims in European societies (Haddad 2002; Hunter 2002; Leveau and Kepel 1988; Nonneman, Niblock, and Szajkowski 1996; Nielsen 1995; Gerholm and Lithman 1988). Of the works that have examined
the dynamics between Muslim minorities and European states, most have cast the challenges of religious difference in terms of “cultural adjustment” (Modood 1992; Carens and Williams 1996; Zolberg and Long 1999; Savage 2004). In other words, they have focused on the fact that Muslims have certain cultural practices that appear to be incompatible with the prevailing norms of the host majority, such as the treatment of women, food regulations, burial rights, the observance of holidays, and prayer requirements. According to the cultural adjustment perspective, the principal challenge posed by the presence of Muslims in Europe is the extent to which the immigrants are required to adapt to the prevailing norms as opposed to the degree to which states and host societies must accommodate their legally resident newcomers.

While shedding substantial light on a variety of political tensions, the cultural adjustment perspective is insufficient to understand many of the current European anxieties surrounding religion. In this paper, I seek to shift the debate about the driving force behind contemporary concerns over religion in Europe. I argue that the cultural adjustment perspective must be supplemented with a focus on violence. The state’s central role in preserving public order and the agenda-setting capacity of shocking events suggest that violence is likely to provoke policy change. In the cases considered here, I argue that perceptions, fears, threats, and acts of violence have underpinned many of the concerns about the place of Muslims in Europe. Muslims have become increasingly linked with violence in both public and political debates over the past decade and a half. These associations—as much as concerns about cultural adjustment—have spurred a re-examination of policies toward religion in a wide variety of European states.

To make this case, this paper proceeds in three parts. Part one reviews the quietism surrounding religion in Europe between the end of World War Two and the
1980s. It demonstrates that the policies of religious accommodation established in the post-war era were not fundamentally challenged merely by the arrival of Muslim immigrants. It argues that three factors—secularization, weak Muslim identities, and a belief in the temporary nature of immigration—helped to keep religion off the public agenda through the 1980s. In this time frame, cultural adjustment was the primary motive behind negotiations over religion, but the cultural adjustments required were perceived to be minimal. Incoming individuals were typically not viewed as Muslims, but were more frequently cast in religiously-neutral terms as immigrants, workers, or ethnic minorities.

Part two traces the growing association between religious differences and violence in Europe from the late 1980s onward, demonstrating that violence has been a central element underlying debates about integrating Muslims. It argues that two of the prominent examples frequently cited in the cultural adjustment literature—women’s issues and ritual slaughter of animals—are particularly emotive political issues because of their associations with violence. It further contends that Muslims are increasingly associated in the public mind not only with terrorism, but also with general criminality and with violent anti-Semitic hate crimes. In addition, it highlights the numerous attacks on Muslims by non-Muslims in Europe, emphasizing that violence across religious lines runs in more than one direction.

Part three examines the effect of violence on state policies. It argues that most European states have responded with an overlapping three-pronged strategy for managing problems of violence across religious lines. First, states have sought to neutralize the “religious” element by developing generic antiviolence policies that often intentionally avoid mention of religion. This can be seen most clearly in policies that target “international” terrorism while avoiding most mentions of Islam.
and making sure to include examples of non-Islamic terrorism in their purview.

Second, states have developed and exercised specific policies to repress perpetrators of religious violence, such as stepping up monitoring of religious actors deemed to be dangerous and making high profile arrests and/or expulsions of religiously-motivated actors. Third, states have sought to integrate religious minorities more vigorously through policies that either encourage or compel integration. Although analytically distinct, the three strands overlap in numerous ways, such as when general antiterrorism laws permit greater monitoring of religious sites, or when policies to repress religiously-motivated crimes are intended to protect and to integrate Muslims or other religious minorities.

The argument is based upon evidence gathered from six European countries since the end of World War Two. Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy were selected because of their variation as early and late immigrant receiving countries, as traditionally Catholic, Protestant, and mixed countries, and as states with an institutional range from formal secularism to an official state religion. Focusing on six countries represents a middle-range research strategy that permits broader generalizations than single-country studies, while allowing for more contextual and historical evidence that would be possible in statistically-oriented studies of a larger sample of countries. The paper focuses primarily on Islam because it is the religion that Europeans most associate with violence. Doing so incurs the risk of reinforcing perceived links between Islam and violence. To offset this risk, the paper includes a discussion of violence perpetrated against Muslims. This helps to undermine one-dimensional stereotypes while reinforcing the paper’s argument that it is violence across religious lines that has contributed to Europe’s renewed attention to religion in recent years.
1. Religion in Western Europe from the 1950s to the 1980s: From Accommodation to Immigrant Integration

The end of World War Two ushered in an era of accommodation in church-state relations across most of Western Europe. Germany’s *Kulturkampf*, France’s heated battles over secularization, and the tearing apart of Spain in the 1930s partly over questions of faith became relics of the past.¹ Fault lines between secularists and Christians (in France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands), Catholics and Protestants (in the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain), and Christians and Jews (especially in Germany, but also across the continent) receded in importance much as modernization theorists predicted. By the 1970s, most states had established a modus vivendi between different groups. In France, secularists had won the day, but continued to allow for chaplaincies in public institutions and offered financial support to religious schools that met state standards. The Netherlands and Germany formally respected all major denominations, while the importance of religious (or secular) affiliation in the public sphere declined in both countries. Britain retained its official religion, but had withdrawn institutional impediments facing religious minorities and did not aggressively assert Anglicanism in public life. In Spain and Italy, the Catholic Church continued to play a prominent role in politics, though that role began to decline substantially in the 1970s as Spain transitioned toward democracy and as a non-Italian Pope took charge at the Vatican.

Since 1945, secularization has been the dominant paradigm for interpreting religion and politics in Western Europe (Casanova 1994; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Minkenberg 2002). In its broadest form, secularization implies that the importance of religion has declined substantially over the past several decades, to the point where it

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¹ Strife between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland is the major exception to this rule.
plays only a minor role in public life. The secularization thesis can be divided into three strands (see Casanova 1994: 19-39). First, social scientists have noted processes of religious differentiation, or separation of religion and the state, with the state increasingly responsible for domains that once had been controlled by the church, such as social welfare, health care, and education. Second, some analysts have argued that secularization is defined by religious decline, as regular church attendance has dropped significantly in virtually every Western European country over the past several decades (Norris 2002: 178-9). Finally, observers have detected a trend toward religious privatization, with spirituality becoming more of an individual choice than an institutionalized practice.

Recent scholarly work on religion and politics in Western Europe has challenged the secularization thesis by finding a significant influence of religious values on public policies (Minkenberg 2002), by identifying factors that may rejuvenate religious participation (Stark and Finke 2000; Jelen and Wilcox 2002: 14), and by demonstrating that spiritual concerns are becoming more widespread across the continent (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 48). Data from the 1990 World Values Survey presents a mixed picture of secularization in Europe. On the whole, individuals surveyed tended to view themselves as religious, evinced modest support for churches speaking out on government policies, but did not hold religion to be very important in their lives. Regular church attendance ranged widely across the countries.
Table 1: Four measures of religiosity in Western Europe from the 1990 World Values Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Are you a religious person, not a religious person, or convinced atheist? (% religious person)</th>
<th>Proper for churches to speak out on government policy? (% yes)</th>
<th>Is religion important in your life? (% very important)</th>
<th>How often do you attend religious services? (% once a month or more)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Inglehart, Basañez and Moreno (1998: V9, V147, V51, V65)

While the most recent round of the World Values Survey confirms a “‘patchwork’ pattern of religiosity and religious participation…in contemporary Europe” (Halman and Draulans 2004: 314), the facts have not undermined the widespread perception that Western Europe has become a secular zone where religion matters little in public life. This perception (as much as any historical trends) has helped cement the overriding sense that major religious conflict was largely in Europe’s past.

Muslim immigrants began arriving in large numbers in the post-war accommodationist era. From the late 1940s through the early 1970s, as many as thirty million people entered Western European countries to take part in the economic boom (Castles 1984: 1). Although millions of these people came from Southern and Eastern Europe, millions more originated in North Africa, Turkey, South Asia, and other regions of the globe with large Muslim populations. Even after the oil shocks of the 1970s dramatically reduced the inflow of male workers, successive waves of immigration due to family reunification and asylum-seeking have brought more Muslims to Europe and have also brought them into Southern European countries that were formerly sources of emigration. Estimates of Europe’s Muslim population are
speculative, as few countries systematically count inhabitants’ religious affiliation and as the depth of attachment to Islam is impossible to measure for each individual.

Savage (2004) draws on estimates from M. Ali Kettani’s *Muslim Minorities in the World Today* and from the U.S. Department of State’s *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2003* to assemble plausible, though liberal, estimates of Muslim populations in a number of European countries:

### Table 2: Muslims in six European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of Muslims (1982 estimate)</th>
<th>No. of Muslims (most recent estimate)</th>
<th>% of population (most recent estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>5 million</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.8 million</td>
<td>4 million</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>886,000</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1.25 million</td>
<td>1.6 million</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Savage (2004: 32)

As significant as Muslim immigration to Europe has been, it is important to recognize that for the major part of the post-World War Two era, these immigrants have not been identified primarily by their religion. Until recently, it was far more common to define Muslims by their immigration or citizenship status (immigrants, asylum-seekers/refugees, or foreigners), by their economic function (guestworkers), or by their race or ethnicity (black, Pakistani, Arab, Turk, etc.). This was partly a result of state rules that automatically categorized people by an established institutional logic, and partly a result of the modes of organization of the migrants themselves.

The prevailing paradigm of secularization and the lack of an organized and recognized Muslim identity in Western Europe thus helped to keep religion off the

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2 Cesari’s more conservative estimates as of the late 1990s are as follows: France, 4-4.5 million;
public agenda. The third factor reinforcing this trend was the widespread belief through the 1960s (in Britain) and the 1970s (elsewhere in Europe) that immigrants were not permanent settlers. As migrants began arriving in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, politicians and publics thought that foreign workers would stay for a few years to earn money and then return to their homelands. Adapting to the new Muslim presence in Europe involved relatively small adjustments, such as providing prayer rooms in factories or hostels (Goldberg 2002: 38; Karakasoglu and Nonneman 1996: 245). These changes were ad hoc and did not require the state or society to re-conceptualize the place of religion in the public sphere. As Zolberg and Long (1999: 17) phrased it, “religious practice, if any, was seen as a private matter, which presumably could be accommodated within the framework of established arrangements—notably, time off from work on weekends.” The grand debates over contentious issues such as Muslim schools, headscarves in public institutions, and religious education had not yet arrived in Europe.

As the 1970s gave way to the 1980s, one of the three factors began to change. European countries began to restrict primary immigration in the wake of the oil shocks of the 1970s, but were unwilling or unable to prevent a second wave of immigration in the form of family reunifications (Hollifield 1992; Soysal 1994; Messina 1996). The arrival of workers’ wives and children brought the dawning realization that these families were unlikely to return to Turkey, South Asia, North Africa, or elsewhere. Understanding that non-European migrants are a permanent part of continental demographics has taken root unevenly within Europe. It has been a function largely of the timing of inflows, of the date that primary migration was curtailed, and of the prevailing notion of citizenship and community within a country.

Germany, 3 million; Italy, 600,000; Netherlands, 696,000; Spain, 300,000; UK, 1.6 million (Cesari
Thus Britain began dealing with the issue in the 1960s, France and the Netherlands in the 1970s and 1980s, and Germany, Spain, and Italy have only truly begun to face the permanency of settlement in the 1990s and 2000s. There are still significant numbers of people—from average citizens to leading politicians—across Europe that have doubts about whether such immigrants and their descendents will ever truly belong in their country. Nonetheless, starting in the 1970s and continuing through today, it has become increasingly common to recognize that many migrants and their descendents are unlikely to leave their new homes in Europe.

The transition from the 1970s to the 1980s also brought with it gradually mounting attention to the religious identity, needs, and activism of post-war immigrants. Researchers began to take notice of the presence of Islam in Europe in the 1980s, publishing books and bibliographies on the topic with greater frequency (for example Leveau and Kepel 1988; Gerholm and Lithman 1988). In part, scholars were tracking a shift in the organization and mobilization of Muslims themselves. The 1970s and 1980s were decades in which Islamic organizations began to crystallize and to multiply in a number of countries. Although not necessarily prominent on European political or public radar screens, a number of Muslim groups were founded or grew substantially in this era, such as DİTİB and the Islamic Council in Germany (Karakasoglu and Nonneman 1996; Goldberg 2002; Nielsen 2004: 183-84).

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3 Britain began restricting primary immigration in 1962.
4 Britain, France, the Netherlands and Germany received large numbers of immigrants in the earliest wave from the late 1940s through the early 1970s. Britain began placing significant restrictions on labor immigration in the early 1960s. France, the Netherlands, and Germany cut worker immigration in the early to mid-1970s. Whereas France and the Netherlands began to view settlement as permanent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Germany insisted that it was “not a country of immigration” through the late 1990s and drew on codes of jus sanguinis to argue that foreigners could not become Germans in large numbers. Spain and Italy began receiving significant numbers of non-European immigrants only in the 1980s and thus faced issues of immigration and integration later than their northern neighbors (Freeman 1995).
In spite of burgeoning activism along religious lines, for the most part, Europeans still failed to recognize the specifically religious aspect of newcomers’ identities. As of the mid-1980s, the widespread concerns across Northern Europe were about immigrant integration (Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994; Favell 1998). The core anxieties revolved around demography, geography, socio-economics, culture, and security. People worried that the immigrants were numerous; that they were concentrated in certain areas; that they were less well educated and less well off than average citizens; that they were culturally different; and that they might pose health and security risks to citizens. The fact that many immigrants came from a non-Christian background undeniably contributed to the sentiment that they were culturally different. However, religion did not constitute the most salient division within European societies. The 1988 Eurobarometer poll that first gathered information on these issues asked opinions about people who were not citizens of the EC, about the level of rights such people should have, about movements in favor of or opposed to racism, and about attitudes toward fascism (Commission of the European Communities 1988: 63-7). It did not collect opinions on people of a different religion, which was viewed at the time as merely one marker of cultural difference among many, with cultural differences comprising only one aspect of a lengthy list of concerns about immigrants.

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5 Harvard University’s internationally-oriented library holds three publications on contemporary aspects of Muslims in Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands between 1945 and 1980, whereas it has twenty-one publications that date between 1981 and 1988.
6 The Turkish Islamic Union of the Turkish Institute for Religious Affairs.
7 Union des Organisations Islamiques de France and the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans en France (subsequently renamed the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France).
2. Religion and Violence in Europe from the 1990s to the 21st Century

Religious fault lines have resurfaced in Europe over the past twenty years. Permanent immigrant settlement and emerging religious mobilization have challenged aspects of Europe’s accommodationist religious model. As the largest non-Christian immigrant population, Muslims have been at the forefront of debates over integration. The contentious issues have differed from country to country, however, funding for religious schools, religious education within state schools, mosque construction, and headscarves have been hotly debated in a variety of European states (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Hunter 2002; IHF 2005; EUMAP 2002). Tensions have cropped up over other issues too, such as ritual slaughter, Islamic rules for burying the dead, and even national blasphemy laws. The variety and intensity of these concerns illustrate that Muslim immigrants have helped to revive discussions about state policies toward religion that were rare in the post-war era.

Academic interest in these topics has taken its cues primarily from theorists of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition (Young 1990; Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995) and has centered on themes of adjustments to diversity (Modood 1992; Bauböck, Heller, and Zolberg 1996; Zolberg and Long 1999; The Runnymede Trust 2000). Tariq Modood (1992), for example, has criticized British politicians, activists, and academics for their blindness to the specifically Muslim identity of many immigrants, and has argued that Muslims should be allowed to mobilize for their rights in a diverse society, just as blacks did before them. Zolberg and Long (1999: 7) state that Islam challenges Europe’s fundamentally Christian identity, and thus constitutes the visible “other.” Carens and Williams (1996: 157-8) contest the popular vision of Muslims as carrying “threatening values and alien ways of life” by
arguing that liberal democratic states may expect cultural adaptation by immigrants but must in turn provide greater openness than they do.

These “cultural adjustment” arguments focus on conflicting values, mobilization around difference, and respect and recognition by the state. From this perspective, political tensions can be explained with reference to value differences among diverse populations. Viewing Europe’s religious politics through such a “cultural adjustment” lens often makes good sense. Many of the disputes at local and national levels revolve around issues such as the way religion is taught in schools, the appropriateness of building new mosques, and whether Muslim girls should be permitted to abstain from swimming in the same pool as boys. These discussions do involve conflict over values, cultures, and identities that put some native Europeans on the other side of the political line from some Muslim immigrants.

The cultural adjustment perspective is insufficient, however, if one seeks to understand why religion is such a live wire in Western Europe today. Discussions of religious-cultural difference are so charged because they are frequently underpinned by associations with violence. This is especially true with respect to Islam, with which Christian Europe has had a series of bloody historical encounters. In addition to dim memories of the distant past and to the pervasive effects of cultural orientalism (Said 1979), the foundation for the present-day connection between Islam and violence was laid between the 1950s and early 1980s, largely outside of Europe. North African decolonization, the 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East, Arab terrorism at the 1972 Olympic Games, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and hostage taking, the 1981 assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat by Muslim fundamentalists, and kidnappings in Lebanon in the early 1980s created and
reinforced the perception of “an historical pattern of Muslim belligerency and aggression” (Esposito 1999: 96; Khosrokhavar 1996: 142-49).

Between the late 1980s and today, perceptions, threats, and acts of “Muslim” violence have become rooted within Europe itself. Muslims have become linked to violence indirectly through the vector of immigrant criminality. In many European countries, especially those with active extreme right political parties, crime and immigration are frequently discussed in the same breath. Although the connections between criminality, immigrants, and Muslims are not always explicit, two factors illustrate the linkages. First, there is a widespread perception among Europeans that immigrants are likelier to be involved in crime than non-immigrants. The 2000 Eurobarometer revealed that fifty-eight percent of European Union citizens surveyed “tend to agree” with the statement that immigrants were “more often involved in criminality than the average” (SORA 2001: 40). This was the majority opinion in twelve of the fifteen member states, and on average only thirty percent of Europeans surveyed “tend to disagree” with the claim.

In addition, scholarship is beginning to focus on the prevalence of Muslims in European prisons. Sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar (2004: 11) declares that Islam is most probably the “primary prison religion” of France. In prisons near the hotspot “suburbs,” he finds that Muslims often make up more than 50% of the population (Khosrokhavar 2004: 11). Although there are no official statistics on the religion of inmates, 2001 French Ministry of Justice data on prisoners and non-prisoners by age and by place of father’s birth suggest a large disparity in populations:

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8 Zolberg and Long (1999: 6) recognize that themes of “danger” and “international terrorism” contribute to the unease surrounding Muslims, but focus primarily on “questions of principle” surrounding quotidian practices as the heart of the conflict.
Table 3: Percentage of male prisoners by age and place of father’s birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Father born in France</th>
<th>Father born in Maghreb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Khosrokhavar (2004: 279)

Table 4: Percentage of males in ordinary households by age and place of father’s birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Father born in France</th>
<th>Father born in Maghreb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Khosrokhavar (2004: 280)

Moreover, Khosrokhavar (2004: 24) notes that especially in Britain, but to some degree in Germany and the Netherlands, higher rates of deviance among Muslims are likely to raise eyebrows in the near future. According to the *Financial Times*, the number of Muslim prisoners doubled between 1993 and 2000, making followers of Islam the third largest and fastest growing religious group in prison.\(^9\) In Italy, although the government keeps no official data on the religion of inmates, an Open Society Institute publication notes that foreigners make up 29.5% of the prison population as opposed to three percent of the total population, and that “six of the ten groups most represented in prisons are from majority Muslim countries” (EUMAP 2002: 257). As these types of statistics become more widely known, public

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perceptions are likely to shift toward the view that not only immigrants, but more specifically Muslims, are associated with high levels of criminality.

Linking immigrants to personal safety and security concerns has been a prominent strategy for far right parties across Europe. Mining this vein means not only associating Muslim immigrants with crime, but also infusing debates over cultural difference with violent associations. In Britain, for example, the British National Party’s “Voice of Freedom” newspaper ran a December 2004 story about ritual slaughter of animals. The article came replete with a photo of a bearded man forcibly pinning down a sheep while holding a long knife. The story quotes Halifax BNP councilor Adrian Marsden’s speech before a public panel: “The vast majority of people want this barbaric practice banned. Animals are slaughtered without stunning, by cutting their throat and leaving them to bleed to death.”10 Across Europe, the well-known campaign of the Brigitte Bardot Foundation uses less inflammatory language, but leaves no doubt that it views ritual slaughter without stunning as causing animals extreme suffering. It levels especially strong criticism at the French authorities for not addressing “the killing conditions of the millions of massacred animals every year in France (30 000 tons of carcasses for the Israeli ritual and 300 000 tons for the Muslim ritual!).”11

The status and role of women has been a focal point for cultural adjustment theorists, who have analyzed tensions between immigrants (especially some Muslims) and native Europeans over broad social values such as equality and tolerance (see esp. Carens and Williams 1996). Yet, many debates about women are also freighted with overtones of violence. For example, Muslim men have been accused of forcing

headscarves on their wives, children, sisters, or fellow students (Carens and Williams 1996; Stasi 2003: 46-7) and in extreme cases have reacted with violence if the women refuse (Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 2003: 61-2). Female circumcision (or female genital mutilation, FGM) has been a concern in a number of European countries (Carens and Williams 1996: 162-67). While more often linked to African immigrants than to Muslims, the World Health Organizations notes that some Muslim communities believe that FGM is required by their religion. 12 Forced marriages have become a politicized topic in Britain, with reports of families sending (sometimes underage) daughters against their will back to the parents’ country of origin to wed. The Home Office and Foreign Office established a joint unit in January 2005 to address the issue and Britain is considering enacting legislation against forced marriages. 13 Not all discussions about accommodating immigrant or Muslim cultural differences are associated with violence, but several prominent ones clearly are.

Beyond these indirect links are more direct examples of “Muslim” violence, which although few in number, are by their dramatic nature likely to register with European publics. The Rushdie affair in Britain was perhaps the first major event to make international headlines. Following publication of The Satanic Verses in late 1988, British Muslims began to protest the book, arguing that it was disrespectful, provocative, and blasphemous. After weeks of marches and attempted lobbying, British Muslims undertook a public book-burning to attract media attention to their cause (Modood 1992: 81). This—coupled with Ayatollah Khomeini’s death-sentence fatwa and the seeming embrace of the verdict by some British Muslim leaders—provoked, in political scientist Elaine Thomas’ words “public fears of obscurantism, barbarism, and violence” (Thomas 1998: 296, 344-45). As Thomas demonstrates,

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concerns about violence were only one part of the ensuing lengthy public debate over
the role of Muslims in British society. Nonetheless, the Rushdie affair was a turning
point that raised the profile of religiously motivated violence on European soil.

France’s headscarf affair came hard on the heels of the Rushdie affair. In
September 1989, three teenage girls were sent home from a suburban Paris school for
wearing headscarves. The conflict erupted into a national debate over the place of
Muslims in French society, and more specifically over the role of public schools in
maintaining France’s secular approach to religion. This conflict contributed to
concerns about Muslim headscarves as a marker not only of cultural difference, and
not only of oppression of women, but also of radicalism (Khosrokhavar 1996: 171-72;
Carens and Williams 1996). The free choice by women to wear a headscarf is also
seen to reflect dangerous fundamentalist (and thus potentially violent) tendencies in
Germany.\(^\text{14}\) Over the past decade and a half, virtually every European country has
debated the place and meaning of Islamic headscarves in public life (IHF 2005). In
Italy and Belgium, the media have picked up stories about local authorities passing or
enforcing laws against appearing masked in public; these provisions target women
wearing burqas on the grounds that they constitute a threat to security (IHF 2005: 46,
100-01).\(^\text{15}\)

A very small number of Muslim clerics have been implicated in incitement to
hatred or violence. In late 2004, Britain charged Abu Hamza al-Masri with
“encouraging followers to murder Jews and other non-Muslims” and Abu Qatada,
who reportedly was the “spiritual counselor” of Mohamed Atta, the principal architect

\(^{13}\) See *BBC News*, 27 October 2004 at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3956399.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3956399.stm); see also the Home


\(^{15}\) See also *The New York Times*, 15 October 2004.
of the September 11th attacks.\textsuperscript{16} In a high profile case in France, Abdelkader Bouziane was expelled from the country following publication of an interview in \textit{Lyon Mag}, in which he reportedly stated that beating and stoning of women was authorized by the Koran.\textsuperscript{17} Similar tensions surrounding inflammatory statements by Muslim clerics have garnered headlines in the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Italy and several other European countries (IHF 2005). Such provocations to violence by “rogue imams” are quickly and roundly condemned by mainstream Muslim leaders. However, the impact of these stories has the effect of raising questions such as “Is there an Imam Problem?”, the title of a special report in the Prospect written by respected political scientist Jytte Klausen (2004).

At times, violence perpetrated by Muslims (or by individuals associated with Islam) has been overt, direct, and brutal. A controversial report—commissioned by the European Union Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, which subsequently distanced itself from the findings—suggested that Muslims were responsible for significant anti-Semitic attacks on people and property that took place in a variety of European countries following the onset of the second intifada in September 2000 (Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung 2003: 24). This finding was echoed within France by official sources (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme 2003). The most notable examples of “religious” violence have come in the form of terrorist acts committed in the name of religion or by actors associated with an ethno-religious identity. In 1995, the Algerian-based Armed Islamic Group (GIA) detonated a series of bombs in Paris and Lyons, killing eight people and wounding over 150.\textsuperscript{18} In late 1996, a bomb attributed to the GIA exploded

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{The New York Times}, 20 October 2004. Abu Hamza Al-Masri was the imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque, which both Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui reportedly attended before their arrests.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Le Monde}, 22 April 2004; see also \textit{Le Monde}, 6 October 2004.

in a French train station killing four more people.\textsuperscript{19} The September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks on New York’s World Trade Center generated significant anxiety within Europe as many of the actors had been part of terrorist cells based in Europe.\textsuperscript{20} The subsequent attempt by British citizen Richard Reid (the “shoe bomber”) to blow up a transatlantic flight highlighted the fact that Islamic terrorism was not confined to people of Middle Eastern or North African origin but could be carried out just as easily by European citizens. More recently, the March 11\textsuperscript{th} bombings in Madrid and the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim extremist shocked Europeans and provoked mounting debates about the connections between Islam and violence.

Threats, harassment, and attacks across ethno-religious lines have not been confined to Muslims as perpetrators. Muslims have been the targets of violent acts for decades in Europe. Following September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001, the European Union Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) launched a study of Islamophobia in each of the 15 member states. They found startling examples of physical violence against Muslims in most countries, the targeting of mosques and Islamic cultural centers for damage, and widespread “verbal abuse, harassment, and aggression” (EUMC 2002: 7). In Britain, for example, Muslim women wearing head-coverings were spat upon, had their hijabs torn from them and were physically assaulted (EUMC 2002: 29). There were attacks on mosques and Muslim-owned businesses in Italy, including a “paper bomb” attack on one imam’s home (EUMC 2002: 22). Muslim organizations in Germany received murder and bomb threats (EUMC 2002: 19). The post-9/11 incidents in the Netherlands were overshadowed in

\textsuperscript{19} The New York Times, 12 December 1996.
late 2004 by a wave of arson attacks on mosques (and presumed reprisals against churches) immediately following the assassination of Theo van Gogh.\textsuperscript{21}

The impact of these events has been reflected in—and amplified by—the media’s coverage of religious issues over the past few years. In most countries, September 11\textsuperscript{th} raised the profile of Muslims dramatically. Media coverage has been at times moderate and informative but at others highly inflammatory or misleading. The Italian press came under fire from in a 2002 Open Society Institute review of minorities in Europe for disproportionate coverage of Islamic extremists and for gratuitous reporting of religious affiliation in criminal cases. The review also singled out the widespread negative impact of journalist Oriana Fallaci’s published statement that in Italy “there is no place for muezzins, minarets, fake teetotalers, their fucking middle ages, and their fucking chadors” (EUMAP 2002: 232). For BBC journalist Roger Hardy, 9/11 was “a huge turning point for Muslims in Europe, for Muslims everywhere and for the relationship between Islam and the West,” which increased the polarization between the groups to the detriment of Muslims.\textsuperscript{22} The EUMC’s Europe-wide report on Islamophobia concluded that there was evidence of more stories “incorporating sensationalism and stereotypes” than of “those providing balance and constructive dialogue,” but declared that it was difficult to measure the impact of the media on public attitudes or actions (EUMC 2002: 9, 50-3).

A number of surveys attempt to pinpoint public opinion on Muslims in Europe and to track changes over time. The 1990 World Values Survey offers one way to gauge attitudes toward Muslims, as it asked respondents to identify types of people they would like to avoid as neighbors. The surveyors displayed a list of groups that

included five “racialized or ethnicized” categories. The results (presented in table 5) show that in the early stages of the politicization of Islam within Europe, Muslims generated the greatest aversion among the five groups.

Table 5: Percent of those surveyed responding “Would not like to have [a member of this group] as a neighbor” – 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Hindus</th>
<th>Other Race</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 1999 European and World Values Survey asked the same set of questions, though it replaced the category “Hindus” with “gypsies” and used a combined poll for East and West Germany. The results (presented in table 6) reveal that gypsies are by far the group that Europeans most want to avoid as neighbors. Although aversion to Muslims has declined on average since 1990, Muslims continue to receive the most negative ratings of the remaining four groups in all countries except Britain, where foreigners are slightly more disfavored, and Spain, where Jews are far more disfavored. Muslims are on a par with “immigrants/foreign workers” for the group Italians wish to avoid most after gypsies.

Table 6: Percent of those surveyed responding “Would not like to have [a member of this group] as a neighbor” – 1999

The question was phrased in the following way: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” The list included drug addicts, heavy drinkers, people with a criminal record, homosexuals, people who have AIDS, left wing extremists, right wing extremists, emotionally unstable people, people with large families, Muslims, Hindus, Jews, immigrants/foreign workers, and people of a different race. See Inglehart, Basañez, and Moreno (1998: V69-82).
Examining attitudes toward immigration from Islamic countries is yet another way to measure how Europeans feel about Muslims. In 2000, the European Union undertook a survey that included a number of questions about minority groups and a specific question about whether people from Muslim countries should be permitted to work within the EU (SORA 2001). The most common response in every country was “accept with restrictions.” Examining the difference between those who said “accept without restrictions” and those who said such workers are “not accepted” provides an estimate of national attitudes toward Muslims. Table 7 demonstrates that attitudes vary considerably across the six countries; it also presents EU 15 average for comparison.

Table 7: Acceptance of people from Muslim countries who wish to work in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accepted without Restrictions</th>
<th>Not Accepted</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SORA (2001: 32)

The same question was asked with respect to people from Eastern Europe. The results (in table 8) show generally greater acceptance, though far from an open
The final column illustrates the difference of differences between tables 7 and 8—in other words, the extent to which the difference is more positive for Eastern Europeans than it is for people from Muslim countries. This demonstrates succinctly the more positive attitudes toward Eastern European immigrants than toward Muslims.

**Table 8: Acceptance of people from Eastern Europe who want to work in the West**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Accepted without Restrictions</th>
<th>Not Accepted</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Difference of Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SORA (2001: 33)

* For statistical reasons, the Dutch data is not directly comparable to other country data

Encouragingly, some aspects of the available data demonstrate that Muslims are not a permanent “other” in the eyes of Europeans. Responses from the 1999 European Values Survey demonstrate a modestly decreasing aversion to Muslims since 1990 in four of the six countries, and Eurobarometer data from 2000 show that Spanish and Italian respondents are quite open to immigration from Muslim countries. In addition, although Europeans tend to be averse to Muslims relative to most other comparable identity groups, Muslims have not become the virtual outcasts that gypsies are across Europe.

Nonetheless, it is clear that many Europeans continue to harbor significant uneasiness about the presence of Muslims in their societies. These negative attitudes also spike directly following acts of violence associated with Islam. A BBC poll of Muslims conducted in early November 2001 found that 30% of respondents felt there
had been hostility or abuse directed at them or at members of their family following
the events of September 11th (Iganski 2002: 7-8). Attitudes toward Moroccans in
Spain were significantly more hostile in 2004 as compared to 1996. Following the
March 11th bombings, 16% of Spaniards polled said they would not want a Moroccan
neighbor (compared to 13% in 1996, and 13% reporting they would not want a
Muslim neighbor in 1999) and an astounding 19% said they favored expelling
Moroccans (compared to 7% in 1996). By 2005, the numbers had dropped off to 12%
and 12% respectively. In the Netherlands, a survey taken within ten days of the
November 2004 assassination of Theo van Gogh revealed that 40% of Dutch people
pollled expressed the “hope” that Muslims “no longer feel at home here.” Muslims
are thus viewed with general skepticism by European publics, and that skepticism
rises significantly in the aftermath of violence associated with Islam.

3. State Responses to “Religious” Violence

Common sense and social science theory both suggest that states will react to violence.
The state’s fundamental role in maintaining order and the responsiveness of vote-
seeking politicians to public opinion are two compelling reasons for governments to
take action. In addition, policymaking theories suggest that violence may serve as a
focusing event that generates media attention and opens windows of opportunity for a
potential paradigm shift (see Kingdon 1995; Birkland 1997; Baumgartner and Jones
1993; Kuhn 1996 (1962); Hall 1993). Birkland (1997: 149-50) argues that the power
of a focusing event to propel issues onto the national agenda is related to the damage
or the seriousness of the disaster. He defines a potential focusing event as a “rare,

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24 Germany’s change from 20% to 11% is the greatest decrease of the countries examined, however this
must be balanced against the highly negative responses with respect to Muslim immigration in
estimating German attitudes toward Muslims.
25 Source: Barómetro del Real Instituto Elcano, on line at
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/barometro.asp.
harmful, sudden event that becomes known to the mass public and policy elites virtually simultaneously” (Birkland 1997: 3).

Studies have demonstrated, however, that not all striking events influence policy decisions and that a number of factors mediate the effects of such events (Kingdon 1995; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Birkland 1997). This may account for the lack of systematic research into the causal links between violence and state action. Given the open-endedness in the theoretical literature, there is no clear baseline expectation for the scope or direction of policymaking in troubled times. At one end of the spectrum, it is plausible that the impact of “religious” violence in contemporary Europe might dissipate if actors disagreed over its causes and thus over appropriate solutions. At the other extreme, it is possible to conceive of a strong reaction that generates a paradigm shift in countries’ management of religious issues. It is difficult to imagine mass expulsions of Muslims in early 21st century Europe, even taking into account the fact that immediately after their national crises, 19% of Spaniards polled wished to expel Moroccans and 40% of Dutch people hoped that Muslims no longer felt at home in the Netherlands. It is reasonable, however, to envision broad national reappraisals of the role of religion in public life along the lines of France’s late 19th century debates that culminated in its 1905 secularization law.

In truth, neither extreme of action or inaction has come to pass. Instead, states have applied an overlapping three-pronged strategy for dealing with acts of violence associated with religion. These three elements are analytically distinct, yet they

26 Agence France-Presse, 15 November 2004.
27 There have been important studies on the role of riots as a generator of policy changes (Button 1978; Karapin 2002). Their conclusions do not yield predictions about the effects of more general forms of violence (such as terrorism, assassinations, or hate crimes) on state actions.
28 Ifikhar Malik (2004: 15-6) discusses contemporary Muslim fears of the “Andalusia syndrome”—the decimation or forced conversion of Muslims in the West.
overlap in that specific policies may fall into more than one category. The three elements of the strategy include:

(1) steps to contain violence that avoid references to religion;
(2) steps to repress violence targeted at members of religious communities or motivated by religious animus; and
(3) steps to integrate religious actors into national life, whether through encouragement or compulsion.

3.1. Generic antiviolence policies

In the past few years, the European Union and individual countries within it have devoted substantial attention to generic antiviolence policies that omit specific references to religion. Immediately following the September 11th attacks, the EU launched an antiterrorism action plan and passed a framework decision striving to harmonize definitions of terrorist offences and penalties among member states.29 After the March 11th bombings in Madrid, the Council appointed Gijs de Vries as the EU counter-terrorism coordinator; in November 2004 it adopted its Hague Program to expand the scope of EU action; and in December 2004 it updated its action plan and adopted specific measures to counteract aspects of terrorism.30

Britain, France, and Germany have also fortified their antiterrorism provisions. Several initiatives were in place prior to 2001, yet it was September 11th and subsequent events that generated striking developments in domestic laws. Britain had passed its Terrorism Act in 2000, but supplemented it in November/December 2001 with its Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, and has since enacted its 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act. France proposed a law in November 2001 and followed it up with a series of antiterrorism measures (Cesari 2004: 37), including in 2003 an updated version of its “vigipirate” plan to warn of possible attacks, to increase

29 Earlier initiatives agreed to in the 1999 Tampere Program were judged insufficient in the aftermath of 9/11.
security, and to facilitate responses to terrorist acts. Germany also established a wide range of new security measures. Interior Minister Otto Schily stated in September 2002, “following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the sets of security measures I and II have successfully created the legal framework that will allow terrorism from any quarter to be countered.” In early 2005, the German government began planning to bolster these provisions with its proposed “security package III.”

European policies have facilitated cross-national tracking of suspects, interruption of financial flows to potential perpetrators, and arrests and sentencing of accused terrorists. These initiatives have sparked debates about their effectiveness and about the willingness of governments to trade off civil liberties for security. Yet equally interesting is the fact that states have largely taken the religion out of religious violence by responding to it with general antiterrorism measures. Many of these laws were crafted with Islamic terrorism in mind, but most states have opted to downplay the specific connection to Islam by referring to “international” terrorism and by including at least some non-Muslim groups on their watchlists or in their public pronouncements.

3.2. Repressing religious violence

31 See the Prime Minister’s website at: http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/information/actualites_20/securete_un_plan_vigipirate_38900.html?var_recherche=terrorisme. It specifically cites September 11, 2001 as a motive for the changes.
33 Deutsche Welle, 14 March 2005.
35 For example, in early May 2004, Spain’s Interior Minister responded to a question about potential legal reforms against Islamic terrorism by saying “we prefer to speak of international terrorism, in this case with a radical Islamic ideological basis.” See El Pais, 2 May 2004.
States have not entirely shifted the focus away from religion. They have also responded with high-profile measures specifically targeting perpetrators of religiously-motivated violence. In particular, many European countries have stepped up monitoring of suspected radical Muslims. There have been official government investigations into the practice of Islam, increased training and hiring of national security agents with relevant expertise, tape recording of religious services and scrutiny of particular mosques, public statements about tabs kept on potential suspects, and extensive use of stop-and-search provisions in Muslim communities.

There have also been proposals to more closely track foreign imams and foreign funding of domestic mosques and even a governmental proposal to require regular reporting to the police by anyone suspected of radical leanings.

Increased monitoring has resulted in raids, round ups, arrests, and trials of hundreds of suspected Islamic terrorists. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain have each engaged in active repression of potential violent individuals.

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36 For example, in the Netherlands, see Facts on File World News Digest, 8 July 2002 and The Jerusalem Post, 9 January 2005.
37 On the Netherlands, see The Christian Science Monitor, 8 November 2004; on Spain, see Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 4 March 2005; on France, see Agence France-Presse, 8 December 2004; on Britain, see The Washington Post, 26 February 2004 and The Christian Science Monitor, 31 March 2004.
38 France began its monitoring program following the bombings of the mid-1990s (UPI, 31 December 2001) and currently has undercover agents reporting weekly to the Ministry of the Interior (ANSA English Media Service, 26 August 2004). On the Netherlands, see The New York Times, 10 November 2004. In Spain, the Interior Minister’s proposal for a law permitting the state to monitor “small mosques” especially closely was quite contentious and eventually withdrawn (El Pais, 2 May 2004; International Herald Tribune, 17 May 2004). In Germany, both the state and the media have engaged in the monitoring of mosques (Ottawa Citizen, 17 November 2004). Italy’s special operations forces (DIGOS) have used listening devices and wiretaps to monitor activities in the Cremona mosque (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 27 February 2004). On Britain, see The New York Times, 25 January 2005.
39 Police in the Netherlands have reported observing up to 10,000 Muslims as “potential terrorists,” UPI, 16 June 2004, and an official in the Dutch Justice Ministry revealed that more than 150 individuals were being actively investigated for suspected militantism, The New York Times, 4 November 2004. On Spain, see The New York Times, 24 October 2004.
40 On Britain, see Financial Times, 24 April 2004.
41 On the Netherlands, see Associated Press, 12 November 2004; on Britain, see Financial Times Information, 7 April 2004.
42 In the Netherlands, these proposals followed the assassination of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. See Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 February 2005.
perpetrators of religiously-motivated violence. In addition, many of these countries have translated the monitoring of mosques into expulsions of so-called “rogue imams,” at times going so far as to strip individuals of European citizenship in order to prohibit them from claims to remain on the continent. France has been among the most active states in this field, having reformed its statutes in 2003 to widen the grounds for expelling contentious imams. More than two dozen religious leaders were deported from France between 2001 and April 2004, with more than a dozen expulsions coming between July 2003 and April 2004. Germany has also deported radical preachers, most notably Metin Kaplan, head of the long-established and radical ICCB. Even Britain—historically allergic to restricting freedom of speech and relatively liberal on residence rights—has taken steps against radical imams. Following September 11th, 2001, the Home Office fired or suspended three chaplains for distributing anti-American literature to Muslim prisoners. Furthermore, Britain enacted laws in 2003 allowing the government to strip dual nationals of their British citizenship and to deport them if they threatened the national interest. Within days of the law coming into force, the Home Secretary moved to withdraw the citizenship of radical cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri in preparation for deporting him. In the Netherlands, the November 2004 slaying of Theo van Gogh prompted immediate proposals to strip radicals with dual nationality of their Dutch citizenship, to shut

46 See The Independent (London), 13 January 2005. The ICCB (the Federation of Islamic Communes and Communities) also known as the followers of Cemalatin Kaplan (the deceased father of Metin Kaplan) has existed in Germany since 1983 and was banned in 2001 (Goldberg 2002: 45-6; Schiffauer 2003: 149-52).
down fundamentalist mosques, and to deport extremist preachers.\textsuperscript{49} In February 2005, the Dutch Immigration Ministry moved to expel four imams accused of radicalism.\textsuperscript{50}

A limited number of European countries have further supplemented their legal arsenal for punishing acts motivated by religious hatred. As a counterweight to the restrictive elements of its 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, Britain created a set of “religiously-aggravated offences” that enhance penalties for crimes motivated by religious hostility. Enacted during the post-9/11 wave of attacks on Muslims across Britain (EUMC 2002: 29-30), the law built on 1998 provisions that created racially-aggravated offences which themselves failed to protect Muslims from specifically Islamophobic actions. In 2004, the British government also introduced provisions against incitement to religious hatred designed to crack down on those who use threatening, abusive or insulting language that is intended or likely to stir up hatred.\textsuperscript{51} If the pre-existing incitement to racial hatred provisions offer any indication, the new law against religious incitement will not generate many cases. Yet, the British government has both symbolically and pragmatically granted itself greater powers to repress religiously-motivated hatred, going well beyond what it was willing to do prior to September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001. Although France enacted laws against incitement to religious hatred in the 1970s, between November 2002 and February 2003, French politicians propelled a hate crimes bill through Parliament with the rapid and unanimous support of the National Assembly. Although barely invoked since its passage, it serves as a symbol of France’s intolerance of the waves of anti-Semitic violence that have hit the country since late 2000 (Bleich 2005).

3.3. Enabling and compelling integration

\textsuperscript{49} Financial Times, 5 November 2004; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 November 2004.
\textsuperscript{50} Associated Press, 23 February, 2005; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 25 February 2005.
\textsuperscript{51} For information on the British provisions, see information from the Community & Race division of the Home Office, available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/comrace/faith/crime/index.html.
European polities have balanced repressive measures by promoting integration of religious minorities. In 2003, the EU held a roundtable discussion to reflect on how to build bridges between faith communities within Europe. It highlighted best practices such as the German Intercultural Council’s “Abrahamic teams” initiative, the Brussels-based European Jewish Information Centre’s “Classroom of Difference” educational unit, and the leadership in the media of the Dutch Program Service’s multi-cultural program manager (EUMC 2003: 94-6). While these initiatives are small-scale, each is funded by a governmental body in an effort to foster interfaith dialogue and tolerance. Government leaders have also attempted to demonstrate their responsiveness to Muslims through symbolic acts such as Queen Elizabeth’s first visit to a British mosque in 2002\(^{52}\) and through proposing legislative changes such as the use of blasphemy laws (in the Netherlands and in Britain) to include protections for non-Christian faiths.\(^{53}\)

Consultation and representation with religious minorities have also risen on governmental agendas. Immediately following the murder of Theo van Gogh, Dutch officials met with Islamic leaders and wrote to mayors and town councils urging them to hold similar meetings.\(^{54}\) Several European cities, states, and the EU as a whole have also actively encouraged the formation of faith-based representative bodies, especially within the Muslim community. France’s 2003 Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) has been the highest profile and most formalized organization in this vein (Laurence 2003), yet Spain’s Islamic Commission has been recognized by the state as

\(^{52}\) To mark her Golden Jubilee, the Queen also visited Hindu, Sikh, and Jewish communities (Associated Press, 23 April 2002).

\(^{53}\) The Observer, 5 December 2004. It appears unlikely that blasphemy provisions will be expanded in either country.

an official interlocutor since a bilateral agreement of 1992.\textsuperscript{55} In Italy, Interior Minister Pisanu set up an Islamic Council in 2004 to advise the government on policies relating to Muslims and to facilitate the eventual establishment of a formal accord between Muslims and the state.\textsuperscript{56} The Italian government also sponsored a religious freedom bill in 2003-2005 aiming to place Islam “on the same legal footing as any other religion in Italy.”\textsuperscript{57} The European Union Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia has advocated the support of Islamic communities’ involvement in local policymaking (EUMC 2001: 54-5). Its 2001 study demonstrated the range of interactions between city governments and Muslims across Europe, from Turin’s passive approach through Rotterdam’s subsidies to a Muslim umbrella organization (SPIOR) that acts as a liaison to the local authority (EUMC 2001: 26-32).

In recent years, European governments have proven more willing to fund initiatives that specifically benefit the Muslim community. In 2005, the Dutch Ministry of Education approved the Free University of Amsterdam’s plan to offer a masters degree in Islamic spiritual guidance and contributed $1.9 million in subsidies to help launch the program.\textsuperscript{58} Municipalities in the Netherlands have also financed privately-organized Dutch language and culture training programs for imams and Muslim chaplains.\textsuperscript{59} France has announced the establishment of a university-based degree program in “contemporary French civilization” aimed at giving future imams a background in French institutions and society.\textsuperscript{60} In Britain, both city and EU monies were used alongside private donations to construct a new $19 million Muslim
community center attached to the East London Mosque. In the wake of the Madrid train bombings, Spain allocated $3.5 million to create a foundation to assist minority religions with integration, marking the first time the government has offered sustained financial support for non-Catholic faiths.\textsuperscript{61} France quickly followed suit by establishing its own foundation in March 2005, albeit without public funding because of its statutory separation of church and state. The foundation serves as an organizing body for collecting and distributing tax deductible donations targeting needy Muslim causes such as mosque renovation, imam training, and support for France’s Muslim representative bodies.\textsuperscript{62} Although none of these contributions is tremendous in scale, each marks a significant step towards supporting projects designed specifically with religious minorities—and especially with Muslims—in mind.

In the broader scheme of European integration strategies, Christian Joppke (2004) has traced the rising skepticism about policies that reify cultural differences. Paralleling this trend, European states have balanced policies that enable integration of religious minorities with policies that compel integration by obliging a degree of cultural conformity. Immediately following the murder of Theo van Gogh in Holland, the Netherlands’ immigration minister Rita Verdonk proposed “that imams be required to speak Dutch and to include Dutch culture in their preaching.”\textsuperscript{63} Following the ensuing violence against mosques and churches in Holland, a German politician argued that Muslim sermons in her country be conducted only in the German language.\textsuperscript{64} In early December 2004, the French Interior Minister announced plans to require future imams to participate in university programs covering French

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Financial Times}, 5 November 2004.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Spiegel online}, 14 November 2004; \textit{Die Welt}, 15 November 2004. This proposal was also floated in the Netherlands in 2002 (\textit{The Guardian}, 1 October 2002). In neither country does it appear likely to become law.
institutions in order to practice in France.\textsuperscript{65} European Union officials also endorsed a constraining form of integration when during a meeting in November 2004, justice and interior ministers agreed on nonbinding guidelines calling for immigrants to learn the language of their host country and to adopt “European values.”\textsuperscript{66} Calls for tighter policies on imams have been coupled with concrete policy steps, though thus far they have been fewer in number and less extreme in nature. In 2002, the Netherlands began requiring foreign religious leaders on temporary permits to take a compulsory course emphasizing Dutch language acquisition and the religious and philosophical traditions of the country.\textsuperscript{67} And as of August 2004, the British government mandated that anyone entering the UK to work as a minister of religion prove a command of the English language.\textsuperscript{68}

The most notable policy compelling integration in recent years is undoubtedly the 2004 French law banning religious symbols in schools.\textsuperscript{69} Although cast in religiously-neutral terms that apply to visible symbols of all faiths, the law’s purpose was to ban Muslim headscarves worn by students in public schools. The legislation grew out of recommendations made by a group of experts that examined the role of secularism (\textit{laïcité}) in the French republic at the behest of President Chirac. The Stasi Commission interviewed dozens of actors with opinions on a potential law, carefully weighing the costs and benefits of such a significant move. In a section of its 2003 report entitled “Affirming a Firm Secularism that Brings People Together,” the

\textsuperscript{65} Agence France-Presse, 8 December 2004; UPI, 8 December 2004.
\textsuperscript{66} The Christian Science Monitor, 26 November 2004.
\textsuperscript{67} BBC, 3 January 2002.
\textsuperscript{68} The mandate also requires them to prove that they are ordained or have been practicing as a minister for at least twelve months out of the preceding five years. See http://www.workpermit.com/news/2004_08_23/uk/immigration_rules_for_ministers_of_religion.htm.
\textsuperscript{69} Article 1 of law no. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 states “Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse est interdit.”
Commission unanimously\textsuperscript{70} proposed passage of the ban, arguing that “the question is no longer of freedom of conscience, but of public order,” citing “tensions and confrontations” in schools, and “pressures” and “constraints” on young women to wear the veil (Stasi 2003: 58). Violence thus played a central role in unifying expert opinion on limiting religious expression in French schools. While politicians’ motives for passing such a law were not restricted to reining in violence, the threat of disintegration and loss of public order clearly contributed to the momentum for the law. Paralleling this move but on a smaller scale, five of the sixteen German federal states have outlawed headscarves for public school teachers, with Bavaria’s culture minister explaining the action by stating that “the veil is widely abused by Islamic fundamentalist groups as a political symbol.”\textsuperscript{71} In addition, as noted above, local authorities in both Belgium and Italy have enacted or enforced bans on burqas, justifying the move by arguing that appearing masked in public presents a threat to security (IHF 2005: 46, 100-01).

While it is often possible to identify particular policies with one of the three strands outlined above, at times policies overlap in interesting ways and fall into more than one category. Generic antiviolence revisions to the criminal code, for example, are frequently employed by authorities to target violence specifically associated with religious actors.\textsuperscript{72} Laws against incitement to religious hatred allow the state to repress religiously-motivated violence while at the same time demonstrating to religious minorities an interest in protecting—and therefore integrating—all state inhabitants. Banning headscarves may serve to undercut religiously-motivated

\textsuperscript{70} With one abstention.
\textsuperscript{71} Agence France-Presse, 11 November 2004. The other regions that have outlawed headscarves are Hesse, Lower Saxony, Baden-Wuerttemberg and Saarland. Hesse has applied the ban to all civil servants.
violence, but it also enables integration among women who would not otherwise choose to wear a veil, and compels integration among women who would elect to don a headscarf. Just as European states are covering their bases through a range of policies, so too may they seek out steps that achieve multiple goals with one policy.

Conclusions
After decades behind the scenes, religion has returned to the European stage. The presence of large resident Muslim populations has helped spur renewed attention to the place of religion in public life. As Muslims and non-Muslims come into contact in Western Europe, researchers have looked to theorists of multiculturalism and the liberal state, immigration and integration, and the clash of civilizations to understand how “cultural adjustments” between groups with different values may cause tensions. This paper argues that such a cultural adjustment perspective is insufficient to understand political dynamics and policy changes currently taking place across the region. It foregrounds violence as a critical factor contributing to religious dynamics in Western Europe. It does so first by demonstrating that the post-war accommodationist status quo was not immediately challenged by the presence of Muslim immigrants from the 1950s through the mid-1980s. It argues that the rising associations between Muslims and violence from the 1980s through today have increased the salience of religious matters in Europe. Finally, it demonstrates how such associations between violence and religious difference—especially with regard to Islam—have contributed to significant policy changes in recent years.

Violence has helped propel policymaking in a number of European countries. It has not been the only factor motivating change, but it is impossible to understand the

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72 The “EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism – Update: Contribution from Europol” demonstrates that EU police are devoting significant attention to the specific threat of “Islamic terrorism.” See http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/europol-terr-plan.pdf.
urgency and the electricity of many policy debates without comprehending the effects of violence on those debates. The responses of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain have not been identical. For example, France and Spain have more formalized representation of Muslims than most other countries, dealing with Islamic minorities is higher on the political agenda in the Netherlands than in Italy, and Britain has been quicker than Germany to enact legislation specifically targeting religiously-motivated violence. Identifying and explaining the variation in state responses to religious tensions is an important avenue for further exploration and is one that has been the subject of recent scholarly interest (Fetzer and Soper 2005).

The extent to which these six countries have pursued similar policy strategies remains striking, however. These states have different relationships with established religions, different confessional histories and demographies, and different Muslim populations and immigrant trajectories, all factors found to be politically meaningful in a variety of contexts (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Minkenberg 2002; Freeman 1995). Yet none of these states has responded to recent challenges with a paradigm shift in its treatment of religious minorities; nor has any state simply ignored events and maintained the status quo. Each is following an overlapping three-pronged strategy of promoting generic antiviolence policies, repressing specifically religiously-motivated violence, and enabling and compelling integration of religious minorities.

Focusing on violence as a key variable not only helps clarify current policymaking, it also suggests areas of future concern. Thus far, European states have ratcheted up repressive powers with respect to Muslim minorities, but they have also sought to integrate Muslim perspectives into decisionmaking processes and have opposed anti-Muslim violence. Such a balanced approach is not inevitable. Any new deadly
attacks associated with religious motives may occasion a reassessment of prevailing policies. A violence-centric perspective suggests that the likelihood of a paradigm shift or of repressive policies carrying the day is amplified if religious difference is widely perceived as leading to violence.

If this is the case, the construction and manipulation of images of Muslims within Europe has much greater significance than commonly supposed. Sociologist Jocelyn Cesari has examined the concept of “Islam as stigma,” noting that the meta-narrative of Islam portrays Muslims as obstacles to modernization and as sources of conflict and threat (Cesari 2004: 21-42). She argues that there has been an overarching conflation between “an Islam perceived as an international political threat and the individual Muslim living in Western societies” that has translated into a sense of Muslims as “The Enemy” (Cesari 2004: 21-2, 35-7). The more individual European Muslims are conflated with terrorism, with violence toward women and Jews, and with general criminality, the greater the likelihood that future high-profile acts of violence will generate a repressive paradigm shift within Europe. Under these circumstances, monitoring and influencing associations between religion and violence in Western Europe is one of the most important tasks confronting politicians and citizens in the years to come.
References


